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Dynamic General Equilibrium and T-Period
Fund Separation
Anke Gerber, Thorsten Hens, and Peter Woehrmann∗
Abstract
In a dynamic general equilibrium model, we derive conditions for a mutual fund separa-
tion property by which the savings decision is separated from the asset allocation decision.
With logarithmic utility functions, this separation holds for any heterogeneity in discount
factors, while the generalization to constant relative risk aversion holds only for homoge-
neous discount factors but allows for any heterogeneity in endowments. The logarithmic
case provides a general equilibrium foundation for the growth-optimal portfolio literature.
Both cases yield equilibrium asset pricing formulas that allow for investor heterogeneity,
in which the return process is endogenous and asset prices are determined by expected dis-
counted relative dividends. Our results have simple asset pricing implications for the time
series as well as the cross section of relative asset prices. It is found that on data from the
Dow Jones Industrial Average, a risk aversion smaller than in the logarithmic case fits best.
I. Introduction
Ever since Tobin (1958), financial economists have been interested in condi-
tions that help to simplify portfolio allocation problems. A great simplification is
achieved by those conditions that allow portfolio decisions to be structured into
the following two stages: first, deciding how to split one’s wealth between a risk-
free and a mutual fund of risky assets, and then allocating among the risky assets
within the mutual fund. This property is known as two-fund separation, or more
specifically, as monetary separation, since one of the funds is assumed to be risk
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free. The conditions for two-fund separation are well known. The seminal paper
in this area is Cass and Stiglitz (1970), out of which an impressive literature devel-
oped, too large to be reviewed here. Instead, we refer the reader to Russell (1980)
and standard textbooks such as Gollier (2001), Huang and Litzenberger (1988),
Ingersoll (1987), and Magill and Quinzii (1996). While the finance literature on
two-fund separation considers asset returns as exogenously given, the general
equilibrium literature derives two-fund separation with endogenously determined
returns. For example, Detemple and Gottardi (1998) obtain two-fund separation
in a two-period general equilibrium model, and Judd, Kubler, and Schmedders
(2006) have recently extended the two-fund separation literature to dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium models.
In this paper, we use the dynamic general equilibrium methodology of Judd
et al. (2006). However, we are interested in a new separation property that simpli-
fies intertemporal asset allocation problems by separating between consumption
and investments in (risky) assets. We call this separation property T-period fund
separation, since in all T-periods there is one mutual fund that is identical for
all agents. One may argue that this separation is even more fundamental than
monetary separation, because before one can decide on how to allocate wealth
among (risky) assets, one must decide how much to invest and how much to
consume.
As in Cass and Stiglitz (1970), Detemple and Gottardi (1998), Judd et al.
(2006), and others, we do not restrict return distributions but seek out conditions
on agents’ preferences and asset endowments to obtain T-period fund separation.
Moreover, as is standard in the literature, we assume that all agents are discounted
expected utility maximizers sharing the same beliefs about the assets’ returns.
Given these assumptions, conditions for fund separation must restrict the hetero-
geneity of the agents’ risk aversion and possibly also the heterogeneity of their
discount rates. Our first result shows that T-period fund separation holds for any
heterogeneity in discount factors if all agents have logarithmic utility functions
and collinear endowments. In the general case of equi-cautious constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) different from 1, T-period fund separation is shown to hold
if and only if agents’ discount factors are identical. In this case, however, any
degree of heterogeneity in the endowments is allowed. These results generalize
Hens, Reimann, and Vogt (2004) to more than two periods. The intuition for our
results is as follows: Under CRRA, changes in wealth do not influence the as-
set allocation. Moreover, since agents have either logarithmic preferences, and
hence are myopic, or else have identical time preferences, on the same invest-
ment opportunities, they will hold the same portfolios of risky assets. Finally,
given these portfolio choices, fluctuations in asset prices result only from the ex-
ogenous dividend process. Hence, agents choose fixed-mix portfolio strategies
whenever expected relative dividends are constant. We proceed to show that the
assumptions we make are tight; that is, in contrast to the two-period case, with
T-periods the fund separation we consider fails for nonunit CRRA with hetero-
geneous discount factors. The reason for this result is that, except for the case
of logarithmic utility, dynamic optimization introduces additional heterogeneity.
The special role of logarithmic utility for dynamic optimization was first noted by
Hakansson (1970).
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In addition to describing the conditions for intertemporal fund separation,
our results are of interest because they relate to various strands of the literature.
Our findings for the logarithmic case give a general equilibrium foundation to the
literature on growth-optimal portfolios. See, for example, Kelly (1956), Breiman
(1961), Thorp (1971), Algoet and Cover (1988), Hakansson and Ziemba (1995),
and references therein. These authors have praised the growth-optimal portfolio
from an individual investor’s point of view. However, if an investor achieves a
higher growth rate than other investors, eventually there will be general equi-
librium effects (i.e., investors whose wealth grows more rapidly will determine
equilibrium prices). In our model, all general equilibrium effects are accounted
for since asset prices, and hence market values and returns, are endogenized and
ultimately explained by the exogenous dividend process of the assets. Hence, our
finding that under stationarity assumptions on the relative dividend process, all
agents play a “fixed-mix” portfolio rule provides a general equilibrium foundation
to the literature on fixed-mix portfolio rules (see, e.g., Perold and Sharpe (1988),
Ziemba and Mulvey (1998), Browne (1998), Dempster (2002), and Dempster,
Germano, Medova, and Villaverde (2003)).
Our result for the logarithmic case also relates nicely to the asset pricing lit-
erature, which is one of the most important applications of fund separation. From
a dynamic general equilibrium point of view, the art of constructing asset pric-
ing models consists of finding an optimal balance between very general models
without well-structured preferences and a large degree of heterogeneity on the
one hand, and very specific models with overly simplified preferences and con-
sumer homogeneity on the other. In the former case, anything can happen, while
in the latter, asset pricing puzzles arise. Fund separation is an important tool in this
respect, since it allows for heterogeneity of consumers while keeping the aggre-
gate simple. Indeed, two-fund separation builds the foundation of the two-period
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and, accordingly, T-period fund separation is
important for the time-series and cross-section properties of relative asset prices.
Our result shows that in a dynamic general equilibrium, relative market values
of assets are determined by the relative dividends of those assets. Valuation for-
mulas for economies with CRRA utility are established in the finance literature
(see, e.g., Roll (1973), Kraus and Litzenberger (1975), and Rubinstein (1976)).
Note, however, that in contrast to the standard partial equilibrium point of view,
our valuation formulas take all feedback effects into account and are expressed
solely in terms of such exogenous characteristics of the economy as the dividend
process, the degree of risk aversion, and the time preference.
While our asset pricing implication for logarithmic preferences has recently
also been derived by Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2006) based on an
evolutionary portfolio selection model, our result for the case of nonlogarithmic
utility generalizes this asset pricing implication to any degree of CRRA. This gen-
eralization allows us to test the log versus the nonlog CRRA case on stock market
data. For quarterly data (1992–2004) on dividends and market values of stocks
from the Dow Jones Industrial Average, we find that a coefficient of relative risk
aversion around 0.57 fits best (i.e., asset prices suggest a smaller degree of risk
aversion than in the logarithmic case (CRRA = 1)). This finding contrasts with the
asset pricing literature, which works with aggregate data rather than individual
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stocks and which finds a much larger degree of risk aversion than in the loga-
rithmic case (cf. Mehra and Prescott (1985), Kocherlakota (1996), for example).
This difference arises because we do not explain the equity premium puzzle (i.e.,
the relative advantage of equity over risk-free investments), but rather the ratio of
asset returns among risky assets.
In particular, our empirical results show that relative dividends have some
predictive power for asset returns. The importance of dividends for asset pricing
has been documented many times in the literature. Considering a present value
model with a stochastic discount factor, Hagiwara and Herce (1997) demonstrate
that the variance bounds are better met when discount factors are evaluated with
observed dividends rather than with consumption. The intuition behind this re-
sult is that dividends reveal more variability than aggregate consumption. More-
over, there is empirical evidence that multifactor models with dividend yields
have improved on the CAPM in explaining the cross section of stock returns (see,
e.g., Jagannathan and Wang (1996), Cochrane (1996)). Therefore, expected stock
returns carry a risk premium for the dividend yield. It has also been found in
pooled and cross-sectional studies that the dividend yield has a direct impact on
stock returns (see, e.g., Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979), (1980)). It can
been shown asymptotically (i.e., for many assets) that this implies a proportional
relationship between relative dividends and expected future instances of relative
prices. Also, the return predictability of dividend yields has been analyzed exten-
sively in the literature. The results are mixed. Black and Scholes (1974) find “no
obvious connection between dividend yields and returns.” However, subsequent
papers find that dividend yields do have predictive power for future stock returns.
Keim (1985) finds that the link between dividend yields and returns is associated
with the “January effect.” Fama and French (1988) find that the predictive power
of dividend yields increases with the time horizon. Campbell and Shiller (1988)
look at dividend yields over time rather than cross-sectionally. On the more skepti-
cal side, Goetzmann and Jorion (1995) argue that at least part of the predictability
found in previous studies is due to survivorship bias. Wolf (2000) also finds lit-
tle evidence for stock return predictability. Our result shows the importance of
relative dividends for stock returns. In a study combining relative dividends and
dividend yields, Spare and Ciotti (1999) show that simple strategies based on rel-
ative dividend yields give attractive returns. An interesting paper by Dimson and
Marsh (2000) connects relative dividend growth with the size premium. But as far
as we are aware, there is no empirical study of relative dividends.
Finally, we show that our heterogeneous agent economy can be described
equivalently by a single representative consumer whose demand function deter-
mines equilibrium asset prices for any exogenously given future dividend process.
This aggregation property is weaker than the demand aggregation of Rubinstein
(1976), according to which the aggregate excess demand function of the economy
can be derived from the decision problem of a single representative consumer.
However, the aggregation property we derive is far stronger than the usual notion
of a representative consumer in the sense of Constantinides (1982). As Welch and
Goyal (2008) have recently emphasized, this notion of a representative consumer
has an in-sample–out-of-sample problem: The portfolio decision problem of the
representative consumer generates asset prices for any given dividend process, but
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the optimization problem fails to explain how asset prices change with changes
in the exogenous characteristics of the economy (here, the dividend process). In
our case, this problem does not arise, since the aggregation we derive also works
out-of-sample (i.e., for any other dividend process).
Since demand aggregation in the two-period model is closely related to Pareto
efficiency and linear sharing rules, we point out the differences between these
properties in the T-period model. In contrast to the two-period model, the as-
sumptions for deriving linear sharing rules (e.g., hyperbolic absolute risk aversion
(HARA) utilities) are no longer sufficient for T-period fund separation.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we set up the dynamic general
equilibrium model. Section III provides an analysis of T-period fund separation
under CRRA, and Section IV presents results from an empirical test of our model.
Finally, Section V presents our conclusion.
II. The Model
We consider a standard multiperiod finance economy with T + 1 periods
(dates) t=0, . . . , T . In all periods t < T , investors can trade in K long-lived assets,
which pay dividends at the beginning of every period.1 The asset market is com-
petitive (i.e., all investors take asset prices as given when choosing their optimal
portfolio). Asset prices are endogenous and determined by market clearing.
In the remainder of this section, we present our model in detail. In the follow-
ing section, we derive conditions under which investors hold the same portfolio
of assets in equilibrium. As our analysis will show, the equilibrium portfolio and
market prices are essentially determined by expected relative dividends.
A. Uncertainty and Information
The model we present here is the so-called event-tree model. The reader
familiar with such a framework may skip this paragraph.
There are S states of nature, where S is finite. Each s ∈ {1, . . . , S} denotes
a path the economy can follow over T + 1 periods. Uncertainty is modeled by an
information filtration
F = (F0,F1, . . . ,FT),
where each Ft is a partition of the set of states {1, . . . , S}. Any ξt ∈ Ft is an
observable event at date t, which we call a date-t-event. Hence, Ft embodies the
information about the state of nature available at date t. We make the following
assumptions on our information filtration F :
i) F0 = {{1, . . . , S}},
ii) FT = {{1}, . . . , {S}},
1Since there is asset trade in all but the last period, we call the model a “T-period model.”
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iii) Ft+1 is finer than Ft for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1, that is,
ξt ∈ Ft and ξt+1 ∈ Ft+1 ⇒ ξt+1 ⊂ ξt or ξt+1 ∩ ξt = ∅.
By conditions i) and ii), there is no information about the state of nature at date 0
and full information at date T . Moreover, by virtue of condition iii), information
increases over time (i.e., everything that is known at date t is also known at any
future date t′ > t). This condition implies that for any date-t-event ξt ∈ Ft, and
for any 0 ≤ τ < t, there exists a unique date-τ -event ξτ ∈ Fτ with ξτ ⊃ ξt. Here,
ξτ is called the predecessor of ξt at date τ .
Let π(ξT) > 0 be the probability of ξT ∈ FT . Then, for all t = 0, . . . , T , π
defines a probability measure on Ft, which we also denote by π, via
π(ξt) =
∑
ξT⊂ξt
π(ξT).
Let d be the total number of events.2 Then, for x ∈ Rd and any t ∈ {0, . . . , T},
we denote by xt the vector in R#Ft that takes values x(ξt), ξt ∈ Ft.3
B. Assets
There are K assets k = 1, . . . ,K, which pay off a nonnegative dividend per
share at the beginning of every period before trade commences in this period. Div-
idend payments depend on the realized event in the given period. Here, Dk(ξ) ≥ 0
denotes the dividend paid by asset k and D(ξ) = (D1(ξ), . . . ,DK(ξ)) denotes the
vector of dividend payments of all assets in event ξ. We assume that aggregate
dividends are strictly positive, that is,
D(ξ) :=
K∑
k=1
Dk(ξ) > 0, for all ξ.
We do not impose any further restrictions on K and (Dk)k. In particular, we allow
for K to be smaller than the number of immediate successors ξt+1 of any date-t-
event ξt ⊃ ξt+1. Hence, the financial market may be incomplete and there may be
redundant assets.
As will become clear, equilibrium prices and portfolios in our model are
essentially determined by relative dividends. For η > 0, we define the η-adjusted
relative dividend of asset k by
Dk
(D)η
.
For η = 1, we obtain the relative dividend of asset k, which we denote by dk,
that is,
dk := D
k
D
.
2d =#{ξ | ξ ∈ Ft for some t ∈ {0, . . . , T}}.
3Alternatively, we can interpret xt as an Ft-measurable function xt : {1, . . . , S} → R (i.e., xt(s)=
xt(s′) whenever s, s′ ∈ ξt for some ξt ∈ Ft).
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C. Investors
There are I investors, i= 1, . . . , I. Investor i has an initial portfolio of assets
¯θi ∈ RK , ¯θi > 0. Without loss of generality we normalize the aggregate endow-
ment ¯θ=
∑
i
¯θi such that ¯θk=1 for all k. Each investor i has a discounted expected
utility function Ui : Rd+ → R, respectively Ui : Rd++ → R, given by
Ui(c) =
T∑
t=0
βti E
[
ui(ct)
]
, for all c ∈ Rd+ (respectively, c ∈ Rd++),
where 0 < βi < 1 is i’s discount factor and ui : R+ → R (respectively, ui : R++ →
R) is i’s von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) utility function. Here, E[·] denotes
the expectation with respect to the probability measure π.4
We assume that all investors have CRRA η > 0, that is, investor i’s von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) utility function ui : R+ → R (respectively,
ui : R++ → R) is given by
ui(c) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1
1− η c
1−η , η ≠ 1
ln(c) , η = 1
.
D. Asset Trade and Wealth Dynamics
In each nonterminal event, investors can trade in the K assets. Let qk(ξ) > 0
denote the price of asset k in event ξ. Note that due to our normalization of the
asset supply ( ¯θk = 1), qk(ξ) is the market capitalization of asset k. It is convenient
to define qk(ξT) := 0 for all terminal events ξT ∈ FT and all k.
For each nonterminal event ξ, let λik(ξ) ∈ R be the proportion of wealth
that agent i invests in asset k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} in event ξ, and let λi0(ξ) denote the
proportion of wealth that i consumes in ξ. Hence, if wi(ξ) is investor i’s wealth
in event ξ, then she holds λik(ξ)wi(ξ)/qk(ξ) units of asset k and she consumes
λi0(ξ)w
i(ξ). The investment strategy of agent i is given by λi=
(
λik(ξ)
)
ξ,k. Observe
that we do not impose any short sale restrictions. However, we will see that there
are no short sales in equilibrium.
Given her investment strategy λi, investor i’s wealth dynamics
(
wi(ξ)
)
ξ
are
as follows.5 At t = 0, wi0 := wi(ξ0) = (D0 + q0) ¯θi, and for all ξt+1 ∈ Ft+1 and
t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
wi(ξt+1) = w
i(ξt)
K∑
k=1
Dk(ξt+1) + qk(ξt+1)
qk(ξt)
λik(ξt),(1)
= . . .
4Hence, we assume that all investors have homogenous and correct beliefs about the states of
nature.
5In order to simplify the notation, we do not explicitly write wi as a function of the investment
strategy λi and asset prices q.
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= wi0
t∏
τ=0
[
K∑
k=1
Dk(ξτ+1) + qk(ξτ+1)
qk(ξτ )
λik(ξτ )
]
,
where ξτ is the unique predecessor of ξt+1 at date τ .
III. T-Period Fund Separation
In the following, we derive the portfolio and asset pricing implications for the
finance economy introduced above. For given asset prices q, investors choose their
investment strategies so as to maximize their discounted expected utility from
consumption. Investor i’s consumption ci ∈ Rd+ is a function of her investment
strategy λi and asset prices q and is given by
ci(λi, q)(ξt) = λi0(ξt)w
i(ξt),
for all ξt ∈ Ft and for all t = 0, . . . , T , where wi is defined in expression (1) and
λi0(ξT) := 1 for all terminal events ξT ∈ FT . For given asset prices q, investor i
solves
max
λi
Ui(ci), s.t. ci = ci(λi, q),(2)
K∑
k=0
λitk ≤ 1, for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
where, as defined previously, λitk denotes the vector in R#Ft that takes values
λik(ξt) for ξt ∈ Ft.
Since Ui is strictly increasing, the optimal investment strategy satisfies
∑K
k=0
λitk = 1 for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1. Moreover, by strict concavity of Ui, any solution
λi to expression (2) induces the same interior consumption ci.6 The first-order
condition for a solution to expression (2) is given by
qkt =
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−ti Et
[(
cit
ciτ
)η
ciτ
cit+1
λit+1,0
(
Dkt+1 + q
k
t+1
)]
,(3)
for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1 and all k = 1, . . . ,K, where Et[·] denotes the expectation
conditional on the sigma-algebra induced by the partition Ft (see the Appendix for
a derivation of equation (3)). Given the properties of Ui, equation (3) is necessary
and sufficient for a solution to expression (2).
Since assets are in unit supply, market clearing requires that the assets’ mar-
ket capitalizations are given by
qkt =
I∑
i=1
λitkw
i
t,
for all k = 1, . . . ,K, and for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1. A competitive equilibrium then
is defined by optimization and market clearing.
6Since we did not rule out redundant assets, several investment strategies may induce the same
consumption.
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Definition 1. A profile of investment strategies λ = (λi)i together with asset
prices q is a competitive equilibrium, if
i) Optimization. Ui(ci(λi, q)) ≥ Ui(ci(˜λi, q)) for all investment strategies ˜λi
and all i= 1, . . . , I, and
ii) Market Clearing. qkt =
∑I
i=1 λ
i
tkw
i
t for all k = 1, . . . ,K, and for all t =
0, . . . , T − 1.
If in equilibrium all investors hold the same portfolio of assets, we say that
the equilibrium has the T-period fund separation property.
Definition 2. A competitive equilibrium (λ, q) is an equilibrium with T-period
fund separation, if there exists (¯λtk)k=1,...,K
t=0,...,T−1
with
∑K
k=1
¯λtk= 1, for all t= 0, . . . ,
T − 1, such that for all i,
λitk =
(
1− λit0
)
¯λtk, for all k = 1, . . . ,K.
Hence in an equilibrium with T-period fund separation, the proportion of noncon-
sumed wealth invested into any asset k is the same across all investors. In this case,
an investor’s portfolio allocation problem is greatly simplified, since she only has
to decide on the allocation of wealth between consumption and investment in the
mutual fund. For the static case (T = 1), Hens et al. (2004) have shown that fund
separation holds whenever all investors have the same CRRA η. For log utility
(η = 1) and collinear endowments, this result generalizes to the case T > 1.
Theorem 1. Assume that all investors have CRRA η = 1, and that asset endow-
ments are collinear, that is, ¯θi = δi ¯θ for all i, where δi > 0 for all i and
∑
i δ
i = 1.
Then there exists an equilibrium with T-period fund separation (λ, q), which is
given by
λit0 =
1− βi
1− βT+1−ti
,
¯λtk =
1∑
j
(
βt+1j −βT+1j
1−βT+1j δ
j
) T∑
τ=t+1
⎛
⎝∑
j
βτj − βτ+1j
1− βT+1j
δ j
⎞
⎠Et[dkτ ],
for all t= 0, . . . , T − 1, for all k= 1, . . . ,K, and for all i. Equilibrium prices q are
given by
qkt = Dt
1∑
j
(
βtj−βt+1j
1−βT+1j δ
j
) T∑
τ=t+1
⎛
⎝∑
j
βτj − βτ+1j
1− βT+1j
δ j
⎞
⎠Et[dkτ ],
for all k = 1, . . . ,K, and all t = 0, . . . , T − 1. This is the unique equilibrium with
the T-period fund separation property.
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The proof, given in the Appendix, is constructive: We suppose that all agents
satisfy T-period fund separation such that asset allocations are determined by ex-
pected relative dividends. Then we show that this property is inherited by asset
prices. Finally, we show that with those asset prices, all agents will indeed satisfy
T-period fund separation. This proof leaves open two questions: Are there equi-
libria without the T-period fund separation property, and if not, what is the driving
force behind equilibria with T-period fund separation? Accordingly, we present
conditions for uniqueness of equilibria in the following text, and we relate T-
period fund separation to the property of linear sharing rules. The latter is derived
from Pareto efficiency and is known to be sufficient for two-fund separation in
static models. As we will argue below, this is not true for dynamic models and
for T-period fund separation. T-period fund separation is a property derived from
the demand functions for assets—not from Pareto efficiency. We show below that
T-period fund separation implies Pareto efficiency, but that the converse is not
true.
By Theorem 1, under logarithmic utility and collinear endowments, the pro-
portion of wealth each agent invests into an asset is given by a weighted sum of
the expected future relative dividend paid by that asset. The significance of rela-
tive dividends in asset pricing was also recently demonstrated by Evstigneev et al.
(2006) in an evolutionary model of portfolio selection. As shown in that paper,
the unique evolutionary stable investment strategy is such that assets are evalu-
ated by expected relative dividends. While Evstigneev et al. (2006) assume that
all investors have the same consumption rate, we obtain heterogeneous consump-
tion rates in equilibrium. As expected, consumption rates increase over time and
with the agent’s impatience: The smaller an agent’s discount factor, the higher the
proportion of wealth she consumes in each period.
From Theorem 1 it follows that there exists a unique price vector and a
unique consumption allocation that is supportable by an equilibrium with T-
period fund separation. Obviously, if there are redundant assets, then the equilib-
rium consumption allocation can also be supported by other (in fact, a continuum
of) investment profiles, where investors do not necessarily hold identical portfo-
lios. Hence, in this case we can interpret the T-period fund separation property
as a simple equilibrium selection mechanism, where all agents choose the same
investment strategy.
If all investors have the same time preference, the equilibrium price vector
is unique (i.e., the equilibrium with T-period fund separation is the only equilib-
rium of the economy) up to the potential nonuniqueness of investment strategies
discussed previously.
Theorem 2. Let all investors have CRRA η, and let βi = β for all i. Then there
exists a unique equilibrium price vector q.
Proof. Since all investors have identical homothetic utility functions, there is
full demand aggregation, that is, there exists a representative investor whose de-
mand at any price vector q is given by the aggregate demand of the agents in the
economy at q (cf. Antonelli (1886)). In particular, q is an equilibrium price vector
in the heterogeneous agent economy if and only if q is an equilibrium price vector
in the representative agent economy. It is straightforward to see that the utility
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function of the representative investor can be chosen to be identical to the com-
mon utility function of investors in the economy. By strict monotonicity and strict
concavity of the utility function, the equilibrium price vector in the representative
agent economy is unique.
Consider the case where expected relative dividends of all assets are event-
and time-independent. In this particular case, Theorem 1 implies that all agents
use the same stationary investment strategy. That is, in each period t the proportion
of wealth invested into any asset k is the same, independent of the event at t and
thus independent of the investor’s wealth that is realized in t. This “fixed-mix”
strategy is a generalization of Kelly’s (1956) “rule of betting” to multiple assets,
as Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2008) have shown.
Corollary 1 (Fixed-Mix for CRRA = 1). Under the conditions of Theorem 1, if
the conditional expected relative dividends of all assets are event- and time-
independent, that is, if there exists a constant dk such that
Et[dkt+1] ≡ dk,
for all k = 1, . . . ,K, and all t = 0, . . . , T − 1, then
¯λtk = dk,
for all k = 1, . . . ,K and all t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
If all investors have the same time preference, then T-period fund separa-
tion holds for all coefficients of relative risk aversion η and arbitrary, though not
necessarily collinear, asset endowments. In this case, the proportion of wealth in-
vested into an asset is given by a weighted sum of the future expected η-adjusted
relative dividends of that asset.
Theorem 3. If all investors have equi-cautious CRRA η and the same discount
factor (i.e., βi = β, for all i), then there exists an equilibrium with T-period fund
separation (λ, q), which is given by
λt0 =
(
Dt
)1−η
(
Dt
)1−η
+
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−t Et[(Dτ )1−η]
,
¯λtk =
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−tEt
[
Dkτ
(Dτ )η
]
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−tEt[(Dτ )1−η]
,
for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1, and for all k = 1, . . . ,K. Equilibrium prices q are given
by
qkt = (Dt)
η
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tEt
[
Dkτ
(Dτ )η
]
,
for all k = 1, . . . ,K, and all t = 0, . . . , T − 1. This is the unique equilibrium with
T-period fund separation, and there exists no equilibrium (ˆλ, qˆ) such that qˆ ≠ q.
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The proof can again be found in the Appendix. This follows the same ap-
proach as that of Theorem 1. By Theorem 3, the fund separation result of Hens
et al. (2004) carries over to multiple periods for all coefficients of relative risk
aversion η if investors have the same time preference. While Theorem 1 has shown
that the same holds for heterogeneous time preference and log utility, the follow-
ing example demonstrates that in general there is no fund separation if T > 1 and
investors have heterogeneous time preference and nonunit CRRA utility. What
makes the log utility case special is the well-known fact that investors are my-
opic, that is, they behave like investors with a two-period horizon (cf. Samuelson
(1969)). By contrast, investors with nonunit CRRA utility are farsighted. Thus, it
is not surprising that heterogeneous discount factors destroy the fund separation
property in case of nonunit CRRA whenever T > 1.
Example 1. Let I = K = T = 2 and let dividends be given by
D1(ξ0) = D2(ξ0) = 0.5,
D1(ξu) = D2(ξd) = 1,
D1(ξd) = D2(ξu) = 0,
D1(ξuu) = D1(ξdu) = D2(ξud) = D2(ξdd) = 1,
D1(ξud) = D1(ξdd) = D2(ξdu) = D2(ξuu) = 0,
where ξ0={uu, ud, du, dd}, ξu={uu, ud}, ξd={du, dd}, ξuu={uu}, ξud={ud},
ξdu= {du}, ξdd= {dd}, F0= {ξ0}, F1= {ξu, ξd}, and F2= {ξuu, ξud, ξdu, ξdd}. Let
π(ξuu) = p1p2, π(ξud) = p1(1− p2),
π(ξdu) = (1− p1)p2, π(ξdd) = (1− p1)(1− p2),
where 0 < p1 < 1 and 0 < p2 < 1. If p1 ≠ p2, that is, if the dividends are not
identically distributed over time, then there does not exist an equilibrium with T-
period fund separation. To see this, consider the case where p1= 0.9 and p2= 0.1
and let η = 2, and β1 = 0.1, β2 = 0.9. Moreover, assume that asset endowments
are collinear with δ1= δ2= 0.5. Assume by way of contradiction that there exists
an equilibrium with T-period fund separation, and let λi be agent i’s investment
strategy in this equilibrium. Then, for k = 1, 2, there exists ¯λ0k such that λi0k =
(1 − λi00)¯λ0k for i = 1, 2. Substituting this into the first-order condition (3) for
agent i = 1 and solving for λ1 (using the market-clearing condition), we obtain
the numeric solution ¯λ01 ≈ 0.52. However, solving agent 2’s first-order condition
gives ¯λ01 ≈ 0.41, which is a contradiction. Hence, in this example there does not
exist an equilibrium with T-period fund separation.
Obviously, we cannot relax the assumption that all investors have CRRA util-
ity functions. If, for example, an investor’s utility function belongs to the HARA
class, then from the static case we know that the investment into the riskless asset
is wealth dependent unless the investor has CRRA utility (cf. Cass and Stiglitz
(1970)).7 Therefore, if in some period two investors differ with respect to their
wealth, they choose different portfolios of riskless and risky assets, and hence the
T-period fund separation property does not hold.
7By contrast, the portfolio of risky assets does not depend on wealth.
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Similarly to the case of log utility, one obtains a fixed-mix strategy in equilib-
rium if dividends satisfy a particular stationarity requirement and investors have
the same coefficient of relative risk aversion η. This is a simple corollary of The-
orem 3.
Corollary 2 (Fixed-Mix for Identical Discount Factors). Under the conditions of
Theorem 3, if there exists a constant dk such that
Et
[
Dkt+1
(Dt+1)η
]
Et
[
(Dt+1)1−η
] ≡ dk,
for all k = 1, . . . ,K, and all t = 0, . . . , T − 1, then
¯λtk = dk,
for all k = 1, . . . ,K and all t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
A particular case, where the conditions imposed on dividends in Corollaries
1 and 2 are satisfied, is that in which the dividend process is independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.). Corollaries 1 and 2 show that a basic insight from
portfolio choice theory, namely, that CRRA implies a fixed-mix investment strat-
egy (Merton (1971)), carries over to the case where asset returns are determined
endogenously. This result is not self-evident, since asset returns need not be sta-
tionary in equilibrium,8 and hence it is not obvious that a fixed-mix strategy is
optimal as it is in the case of exogenous asset returns.
From the static two-period case it is well known that equilibrium allocations
are Pareto efficient if the riskless asset and investor endowments lie in the asset
span and if all investors have HARA utility functions and each investor’s risk tol-
erance has the same slope. This result follows from the fact that the consumption
sharing rules are affine linear in a Pareto-efficient allocation. Hence, any equilib-
rium allocation is Pareto efficient since it is constrained Pareto efficient and any
Pareto-efficient allocation lies in the asset span. Below, we argue that this result
does not necessarily carry over to the multiperiod case. First we show that the
static result on affine linear consumption sharing rules still holds if there are more
than two periods (T > 1).
Theorem 4. Let all agents have linear risk tolerance (HARA utility) with com-
mon slope, that is,
− u
i ′(x)
ui ′′(x)
= ai + bx,
for some constants ai ∈ R+ and b ∈ R and all i = 1, . . . , I. If (ci)i is a Pareto-
efficient allocation, then for all i there exist (αit)t, (γit)t, where αit and γit do not
depend on the event ξt at date t and
∑
i α
i
t = 0,
∑
i γ
i
t = 1 for all t, such that
cit = α
i
t + γ
i
tDt, t = 0, . . . , T.
8This is due to the fact that aggregate dividends Dt , which enter asset prices, need not be stationary
under the conditions of Corollaries 1 and 2.
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If ai=0 for all i (CRRA utility), then αit=0 for all i (i.e., there is linear sharing in
any Pareto-efficient allocation). If, in addition, all agents have the same discount
factor (βi = β for all i), then γit = γi is independent of t and hence for all i,
cit = γ
iDt, t = 0, . . . , T.
The proof is provided in the Appendix. By Theorem 4, in the case of CRRA
utility, the consumption sharing rule is linear and any Pareto-efficient allocation
lies in the asset span. Nevertheless, as we have seen in Example 1, an equilibrium
with T-period fund separation does not necessarily exist if investors have nonunit
CRRA utility functions and heterogeneous time preference. In Example 1 we have
ai = 0 for i = 1, 2, and hence for any Pareto-efficient allocation c there exist
γit , t = 0, . . . , T, i= 1, 2, such that cit = γitDt, for all t = 0, . . . , T , and all i= 1, 2.
For an interior Pareto-efficient allocation c we can use the proof of Theorem 4 to
compute the investors’ consumption shares as follows:
γ1t =
(
1 +
√
μ2
μ1
9t
)−1
and γ2t =
√
μ2
μ1
9t
(
1 +
√
μ2
μ1
9t
)−1
,
for all t = 0, . . . , T , where μ1 > 0 and μ2 > 0 are constant. Hence, the con-
sumption share of the relatively more patient investor 2 (β2 = 0.9) converges to 1
for t → ∞, while the consumption share of the impatient investor 1 (β1 = 0.1)
converges to 0 for t→∞.
From Example 1 we conclude that a linear consumption sharing rule is not
sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium with T-period fund separation if
T > 1. Moreover, equilibrium consumption allocations are not necessarily Pareto
efficient in case of nonunit CRRA. However, in an equilibrium with T-period fund
separation as characterized above, the corresponding consumption allocation is
always efficient.
Theorem 5 (Effective Completeness). The consumption allocation (c∗i)i corre-
sponding to the equilibrium with T-period fund separation (λ∗, q∗) in Theorems 1
and 3 is Pareto efficient.
The proof, given in the Appendix, is a simple computation showing that all
agents’ utility gradients are collinear at the consumption allocation corresponding
to the equilibrium with T-period fund separation. Effective completeness of the
asset market implies the existence of a representative investor whose portfolio
decision problem generates the equilibrium asset prices for the heterogeneous
agent economy.
Theorem 6 (Representative Agent Equilibrium). Assume that the conditions of
Theorem 1, respectively Theorem 3, are satisfied and let (λ∗, q∗) be the corre-
sponding equilibrium with T-period fund separation. Then there exists a represen-
tative investor with expected utility function ˆU :Rd++ → R, respectively ˆU :Rd+ →
R, and endowment e¯ ∈ Rd++, where e¯t = Dt for all t = 0, . . . , T , such that equilib-
rium asset prices in the representative agent economy are given by q∗.
If investors in the heterogeneous agent economy have CRRA η, then ˆU can
be chosen to have expected utility form with the same CRRA η. Moreover, ˆU is
independent of the future dividend process (Dt)t=1,...,T .
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Out of equilibrium, the demand function of the representative agent is equal
to the aggregate demand in the heterogeneous agent economy if investors have
the same time preference (see the proof of Theorem 2). By Theorem 6, under
heterogeneous time preference we have a weaker form of demand aggregation,
where the demand function of the representative agent determines equilibrium
asset prices for any given future dividend process. Hence, we have demand ag-
gregation in a sense that is most relevant to asset pricing theory.
IV. Empirical Results
In this section, we provide an empirical test of the theoretical results derived
above. In particular, we test whether market prices, in fact, can be explained by
relative dividends as is predicted by the T-period fund separation model devel-
oped in the previous section. The main goal of our empirical analysis is to esti-
mate the consumers’ coefficient of risk aversion, as derived in Theorem 3, which
can be seen as a representative consumer’s coefficient of risk aversion according
to Theorem 6. Interestingly, our estimated coefficient is much closer to the risk
aversion observed in experimental studies (which is below 1) than to the risk aver-
sion found in tests of Lucas’s (1978) asset pricing model (which has been shown
for different data frequencies to be at least 10).9
A. The Econometric Hypothesis
We want to estimate the structural parameters of the rational dynamic asset
pricing model with T-period fund separation developed in the previous section.
To this end, recall Theorem 3, which characterizes an equilibrium with T-period
fund separation. If all investors have equi-cautious CRRA η and the same discount
factor, that is, βi = β for all i, then there exists an equilibrium with T-period fund
separation (λ, q), which is given by
λt0 =
(
Dt
)1−η
(
Dt
)1−η
+
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−t Et[(Dτ )1−η]
,
¯λtk =
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−tEt
[
Dkτ
(Dτ )η
]
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−tEt[(Dτ )1−η]
,
for all time periods t = 0, . . . , T − 1, and for all assets k = 1, . . . ,K. Recall that
aggregate dividends in period t are denoted by
Dt :=
K∑
k=1
Dkt > 0,
9See, for instance, Kocherlakota (1996).
384 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
that λt0 denotes the fraction of wealth consumed in t, and that ¯λtk is the proportion
of nonconsumed wealth invested into asset k. Equilibrium prices q are given by
qkt = (Dt)
η
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tEt
[
Dkτ
(Dτ )η
]
,
for all k = 1, . . . ,K, and all t = 0, . . . , T − 1. This is the unique equilibrium with
T-period fund separation, and there exists no equilibrium (ˆλ, qˆ) such that qˆ ≠ q.
In that model, deep parameters θ=(β, η) have to be estimated based on data.
The logarithmic case provides a general equilibrium foundation for the growth-
optimal portfolio literature. Thus, we will also test the hypothesis H0: η = 1.
Subsequently, we describe the data we use to estimate that hypothesis, present an
adequate estimation methodology, and discuss the empirical results.
B. The Data
To estimate the asset pricing model with T-period fund separation, we need
stock prices and dividend payments of individual stocks. It is more difficult to
collect dividend data of good quality than accurate stock price data. Top-tier
databases archive dividend data since 1992. To have a sufficient database, we
have decided to take dividends at the highest possible frequency, which is quar-
terly, paid on the stocks of the companies listed in Table 1. Among the 100 largest
stocks with respect to market capitalization in 2004, we have chosen those from
the First Call database that provide a complete history since 1992. The respective
stock prices are taken from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
database.
TABLE 1
Summary Statistics for Relative Dividends
JB and ADF denote the Jarque-Bera (1987) test for normality (null: normal distribution) and the augmented Dickey-Fuller
(1979) test for unit roots (null: random walk), respectively. The data range from March 31, 1992 to June 30, 2004 and are
quarterly.
p-Value
Std.
Company Mean Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB ADF
3M 0.1320 0.0527 1.0383 3.5838 0.0079 0.5222
Altria 0.0832 0.0357 1.3748 5.2152 0.0000 0.4904
American Express 0.0275 0.0099 0.4960 2.2252 0.1920 0.2609
Bank of New York 0.0225 0.0105 0.7649 2.7828 0.0831 0.0013
General Electric 0.0162 0.0082 1.4912 6.2053 0.0000 0.3815
General Motors 0.2442 0.1416 0.5259 2.4241 0.2236 0.0924
Hewlett Packard 0.0216 0.0104 0.1991 1.7377 0.1612 0.8243
Intel 0.0092 0.0079 2.0340 8.0703 0.0000 0.0925
IBM 0.1148 0.0637 –0.0605 2.0475 0.3828 0.7228
J. P. Morgan Chase 0.0551 0.0162 0.0284 2.2113 0.5213 0.5807
Johnson & Johnson 0.0335 0.0169 1.0705 3.0277 0.0084 0.2015
McDonalds 0.0190 0.0058 0.0588 2.1375 0.4542 0.3722
Merrill Lynch 0.0429 0.0261 0.6716 2.6040 0.1297 0.3116
Microsoft 0.0071 0.0057 0.2325 1.5908 0.1009 0.5072
Pfizer 0.0137 0.0096 0.6306 2.1112 0.0838 0.1695
United Technologies 0.0756 0.0415 0.6990 2.1477 0.0613 0.1880
Wachovia 0.0819 0.0352 0.3440 2.5655 0.5018 0.4982
A key novelty of our theoretical model is that it explains stock market prices
by η-adjusted relative dividends, Dk/ ¯Dη . We report basic summary statistics for
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relative dividends dk = Dk/ ¯D in Table 1.10 We cannot reject the hypothesis that
relative dividends contain unit roots. The results obtained from the Jarque-Bera
(1987) test for normality are mixed.
This property of the data makes it doubtful that standard estimation pro-
cedures such as generalized method of moments (GMM) will work well. Fur-
thermore, due to the discounting of all future relative dividends, the econometric
hypothesis cannot easily be written as moment conditions to be estimated by
GMM. As a solution, we therefore estimate the model in the econometric hy-
pothesis using an estimation method that builds on Den Haan and Marcet (1990)
and that was first put forward in Lettau, Semmler, and Woehrmann (2007).
C. Estimation of Nonlinear Dynamic General Equilibrium Models
We apply an estimation procedure for dynamic optimization problems based
on first-order conditions of the following form:
zt = Et [f (zt+1, zt+2, . . . ; θ)] ,(4)
where zt is a vector of state and control variables and θ refers to the structural
(deep) parameters of the economic model. To solve dynamic optimization prob-
lems numerically, Den Haan and Marcet (1990) suggest parameterizing expecta-
tions by a linear or preferably nonlinear function ψ, which depends on a parameter
vector ω and the partition of the states of nature Ft, that is,
Et [f (zt+1, zt+2, . . . ; θ)] = E [f (zt+1, zt+2, . . . ; θ)|Ft] = ψ(Ft ; ω).11(5)
Hence, determining expectations given the trajectories of z is a stochastic approx-
imation problem,
min
ω
Σ(z, ω) = ‖f (z ; θ)− ψ(F ; ω)‖,(6)
where ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm, which is calculated in data samples as
mean squared error. The solution to the dynamic problem (4) based on parameter-
ized expectations (5) and (6) is the vector ω¯ satisfying ω(i)=ω(i−1)=ω¯ for large i,
where ω(i) is defined iteratively as follows: Let ω(0) be an arbitrary starting point.
For i ≥ 1, let
ω(i) = (1− ν)ω(i−1) + ν argminωΣ(zt+1, zt+2, . . . , ω) and
zt = ψ(Ft ; ω¯),
where ν ∈ (0, 1] describes the rate of convergence. Den Haan and Marcet (1990)
find numerically that convergence is reached in models such as the neoclassical
10Note, that those results do not change qualitatively for η-adjusted relative dividends in case of
realistic values for η.
11The dimension of the vector ω equals the number of parameters in the function chosen to
specify ψ.
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growth model. To justify numerical convergence, we suggest that the p-value be
associated with the null hypothesis H0: ω(i) = ω(i−1). This iteration describes
local convergence. However, Den Haan and Marcet (1990) claim that transversal-
ity conditions or the assumption of time-invariant solutions may ensure a unique
solution in the above iterative map.
We assume that empirical asset prices are generated by the solution to the
above iterative map. Thus, we estimate the structural parameters by choosing θ,
such that the parameterized expectations (5) imply a time series for z that is closest
to the empirical observation of z.12 Formally, we estimate the structural parame-
ters ˆθ as
ˆθ = argminθ‖z− ψ(F ; ωˆ)‖, s.t. ωˆ = argminωΣ(z, ω),
ˆθ can be found by grid search, while the adequate algorithm for determining ωˆ
is given by the concrete functional form of ψ(·). In Lettau et al. (2007), it is
shown by simulation of the neoclassical stochastic growth model of Kydland and
Prescott (1982) that this inferential approach applied to dynamic models reveals
a small bias in small samples.
D. Estimating the T-Period Fund Separation Model
Now we are well equipped to test the econometric hypothesis in the first
paragraph of this section. Deep parameters θ=(β, η) are estimated. The filtration
Ft is generated by dkt and ¯λtk. Applying the inference scheme described above
to the first-order conditions of our dynamic model provided in Theorem 3, we
solve13
ˆθ = argminθ
T∑
t=0
‖qt − qˆt‖,
s.t. qˆkt = ¯λtk(Dt)
η
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−t(Dt)1−η,
¯λtk =
1∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−t(Dt)1−η
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tψ(dkt , ¯λtk ; ωˆ),
ψ(dkt , ¯λtk ; ω) = ω1 + ω2dkt + ω3¯λtk + ω4(dkt )2 + ω5dkt ¯λtk + ω6(¯λtk)2
+ ω7(dkt )3 + ω8(dkt )2¯λtk + ω9dkt (¯λtk)2 + ω10(¯λtk)3,
ωˆ = argminω‖(Dτ )1−η
(
λt+1,0dkt+1 + (1− λt+1,0)¯λt+1,k
)
− ψ(dt ; ω)‖,
12That is, we do not calibrate the model by solving it numerically.
13Note that in this specification the filtration does not contain a lagged independent variable.
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λt0 =
D1−ηt
D1−ηt +
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−t(Dt)1−η
.
Note that qt = (q1t , . . . , qKt ) and qˆt = (qˆ1t , . . . , qˆKt ) denote observed and estimated
prices, respectively. We use the grid search technique to estimate the structural
parameters. The discount factor, β, and the coefficient of risk aversion, η, are
suspected to be in the interval [0.8, 1) and [0.1, 40], respectively. Here, ψ(·) rep-
resents a third-order polynomial function. We will also use a second-order poly-
nomial by setting ω7 = ω8 = ω9 = ω10 = 0. The parameters ω are determined by
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.
Results for the estimation of model parameters β and η with K = 17 stocks
as listed in Table 1 for T=49 quarterly data points, ranging from March 31, 1992
to June 30, 2004, are reported in Table 2. We find that a coefficient of relative risk
aversion around 0.550 and a discount factor of 0.985 fit best14 (i.e., asset prices
would suggest a weaker degree of risk aversion than in the logarithmic case, that
is η= 1). This result is robust with respect to the degree of the polynomial chosen
in the estimation procedure. The null hypothesis H0: η = 1 can be rejected with
low p-values of the Wald test.15
TABLE 2
Estimation Results of the Structural Parameters
The degree of polynomial refers to the functional approximation of conditional expectations in Theorem 3 as discussed
above. The null hypothesis of the Wald test is H0: η = 1. RMSE stands for the root mean squared error.
Polynomial βˆ ηˆ RMSE Wald p-Value
Second order 0.985 0.556 4.213 4.2E-04
Third order 0.985 0.552 4.042 7.6E-04
Finally, we conduct a sensitivity analysis of ηˆ by using various time periods
for the estimation. The results in Figure 1 indicate that the risk aversion is es-
timated quite robustly around 0.5, although relative dividends are nonstationary.
This finding contrasts with the asset pricing literature, which uses consumption
to evaluate the stochastic discount factor (see, e.g., Mehra and Prescott (1985),
Kocherlakota (1996)). This literature finds a much larger degree of risk aversion,
because aggregate consumption is too smooth. However, here we focus on stock
prices explained by relative dividends rather than considering the equity premium
puzzle. In Table 3, we evaluate the performance of the estimation results. The
explained variation in individual stock returns is no worse than the explanation
of the successful attempts at solving the equity premium puzzle by Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) or Barberis and Huang (2001).
14Regarding the estimation horizon, the 3-month LIBOR was, on average, 4.33%, suggesting that
a discount factor of 0.985 is reasonable.
15Given that ηˆ ∼ N (η, σ), σ > 0, results of asymptotic theory give us (ηˆ − 1)2/σˆ2 ∼ F(1,
T−1), which leads directly to a t-test for the hypothesis η= 1, frequently termed the Wald test. Here,
σˆ is obtained by omitting each data point once.
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FIGURE 1
Sensitivity Analysis of ηˆ
In Figure 1, the line shows estimations ηˆ with respect to selected intervals of 10 years in our data.
TABLE 3
Goodness-of-Fit of the Estimation
The R 2 for stock returns forecasted by the estimated model of Theorem 3 based on second-order polynomials. Due to the
finite horizon, we have omitted the last three quarters.
Company R 2
3M 0.5337
Altria 0.6736
American Express 0.5765
Bank of New York 0.7195
General Electric 0.3642
General Motors 0.6873
Hewlett Packard 0.7612
Intel 0.7868
IBM 0.7740
J. P. Morgan Chase 0.8226
Johnson & Johnson 0.1922
McDonalds 0.3039
Merrill Lynch 0.5885
Microsoft 0.7751
Pfizer 0.1444
United Technologies 0.5984
Wachovia 0.8583
V. Conclusion
It is well known that general equilibrium models can generate any given
arbitrage-free asset price process if the set of investors can be chosen freely. How-
ever, empirical results on asset prices show a quite robust structure, suggesting
that the general model can be simplified without losing empirical content. Proper-
ties of fund separation are very useful in this respect, since they introduce simple
structures on asset allocation decisions that help to organize the data.
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In this paper, we have investigated the conditions for separating the con-
sumption decision from the asset allocation decision in a T-period general equi-
librium model. We call this property T-period fund separation. It is found that with
logarithmic utilities, T-period fund separation holds for heterogeneous discount
factors, while in the more general case of CRRA, homogeneous discount fac-
tors must be assumed. The empirical analysis shows that our data support a risk
aversion smaller than in the logarithmic case. The conditions found are strong
enough to represent the economy by a single representative investor whose de-
cision problem not only generates a given path of asset prices, but who is also
able to predict correctly the changes in asset prices resulting from changes in the
dividend process.
Our asset pricing results are based on simplifying assumptions restricting the
heterogeneity of agents. It would be interesting to see to what extent these results
could be reproduced by introducing a high degree of heterogeneity of investors.
For the static general equilibrium model, it is well known that going to the other
extreme by allowing for any degree of heterogeneity would also lead to useful
structures for market demand, and hence for equilibrium prices (e.g., Grandmont
(1992), Quah (1997)). We hope that our paper helps to extend these results to the
dynamic general equilibrium model of a financial market considered here.
Appendix. Proofs
General Considerations. In the following we derive the first-order condition (3) for the
optimization problem (2). The first-order condition for an interior solution λi to problem
(2) is given by
∂Ui(ci(λi, q))
∂λik(ξt)
= αi(ξt),
for all k = 0, . . . ,K, all ξt ∈ Ft, and all t = 0, . . . , T − 1, where αi(ξt) is a Lagrange
multiplier. Hence, for all k = 1, . . . ,K, and all ξt ∈ Ft,
∂Ui(ci(λi, q))
∂λi0(ξt)
=
∂Ui(ci(λi, q))
∂λik(ξt)
,
∂Ui(ci(λi, q))
∂λi0(ξt)
= wi(ξt)∂ξt U
i = βtiπ(ξt)u
i ′(ci(ξt))wi(ξt), 16
where
∂ξt U
i
:=
∂Ui(ci)
∂ci(ξt)
.
Moreover,
∂Ui
∂λik(ξt)
=
T∑
τ=t+1
∑
ξτ⊂ξt
∂ξτU
iλi0(ξτ )
∂wi(ξτ )
∂λik(ξt)
=
T∑
τ=t+1
∑
ξτ⊂ξt
βτi π(ξτ )u
i ′(ci(ξτ ))λi0(ξτ )
∂wi(ξτ )
∂λik(ξt)
.
16Here and in the following we write, in short, ci(ξt) instead of ci(λi, q)(ξt).
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Let ξτ ⊂ ξt and let ξt+1, . . . , ξτ−1 be the unique predecessors of ξτ in periods t +
1, . . . , τ − 1. Then
∂wi(ξτ )
∂λik(ξt)
= wi0
Dk(ξt+1) + qk(ξt+1)
qk(ξt)
τ−1∏
s=0
s ≠ t
[
K∑
k=1
Dk(ξs+1) + qk(ξs+1)
qk(ξs)
λik(ξs)
]
= wi(ξt)
Dk(ξt+1) + qk(ξt+1)
qk(ξt)
τ−1∏
s=t+1
[
K∑
k=1
Dk(ξs+1) + qk(ξs+1)
qk(ξs)
λik(ξs)
]
=
wi(ξt)
wi(ξt+1)
w
i(ξτ )
Dk(ξt+1) + qk(ξt+1)
qk(ξt)
.
Hence, the first-order condition becomes
qkt =
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−ti Et
[
ui ′(ciτ )
ui ′(cit)
wiτ
wit+1
λiτ0
(
Dkt+1 + q
k
t+1
)]
=
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−ti Et
[
ui ′(ciτ )
ui ′(cit)
ciτ
cit+1
λit+1,0
(
Dkt+1 + q
k
t+1
)]
=
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−ti Et
[(
cit
ciτ
)η
ciτ
cit+1
λit+1,0
(
Dkt+1 + q
k
t+1
)]
,
for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1 and all k = 1, . . . ,K, where Et[·] denotes the expectation condi-
tional on the sigma-algebra induced by the partition Ft. This proves the first-order condition
(3).
Proof of Theorem 1. The first-order condition (3) for η = 1 reads
qkt =
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−ti Et
[
cit
cit+1
λit+1,0
(
Dkt+1 + q
k
t+1
)]
.(A-1)
If there exists an equilibrium with T-period fund separation, then, for all l and all t there
exists ¯λtl such that λitl = (1− λit0)¯λtl for all i, which implies
qlt =
∑
j
λjtlw
j
t = ¯λtl
∑
j
(1− λjt0)wjt
and hence
cit
cit+1
λit+1,0 =
λit0w
i
t
wit+1
=
λit0∑
l
Dlt+1+q
l
t+1
qlt
λitl
=
λit0
1− λit0
∑
j
(1− λjt0)wjt
1
Dt+1 + q¯t+1
,
where
q¯t :=
K∑
l=1
qlt for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
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Substituting this into equation (A-1) gives
¯λtk =
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−ti
λit0
1− λit0
Et
[
Dkt+1 + qkt+1
Dt+1 + q¯t+1
]
.
Since
∑K
k=1
¯λtk = 1, it follows that
λit0 =
1
1 +
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−t
i
=
1− βi
1− βT+1−ti
and(A-2)
¯λtk = Et
[
Dkt+1 + qkt+1
Dt+1 + q¯t+1
]
,
for all i, for all k = 1, . . . ,K, and all t = 0, . . . , T − 1. From
q¯t+1 =
∑
j
(1− λjt+1,0)wjt+1,
it follows that
qkt+1 = ¯λt+1,k q¯t+1
and hence
¯λtk = Et
[
Dkt+1 + ¯λt+1,kq¯t+1
Dt+1 + q¯t+1
]
.
Therefore, it remains to solve for q¯t, for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1. For t = 0, we have
q¯0 =
∑
j
(1− λj00)w j0 =
∑
j
(1− λj00)(D0 + q0) δ j ¯θ
= (D0 + q¯0)
∑
j
(1− λj00) δ j.
This implies
q¯0 = D0
∑
j(1− λj00) δ j∑
j λ
j
00 δ
j .(A-3)
Since
w
j
t+1 = (1− λjt0)wjt
∑
k
¯λtk
Dkt+1 + qkt+1
qkt
= (1− λjt0)wjt
Dt+1 + q¯t+1
q¯t
= . . .
= wj0
t∏
τ=0
(
(1− λjτ0)
Dτ+1 + q¯τ+1
q¯τ
)
,
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it follows that
q¯t+1 =
∑
j
(1− λjt+1,0)wjt+1
=
t∏
τ=0
(
Dτ+1 + q¯τ+1
q¯τ
)∑
j
(
w
j
0
t+1∏
τ=0
(1− λjτ,0)
)
= (D0 + q¯0)
t∏
τ=0
(
Dτ+1 + q¯τ+1
q¯τ
)∑
j
(
δ j
t+1∏
τ=0
(1− λjτ,0)
)
.
From
1− λit0 = βi 1− β
T−t
i
1− βT+1−ti
we compute
t+1∏
τ=0
(1− λiτ,0) = β
t+2
i − βT+1i
1− βT+1i
,
and hence
q¯t+1 = (D0 + q¯0)
t∏
τ=0
(
Dτ+1 + q¯τ+1
q¯τ
)∑
j
(
βt+2j − βT+1j
1− βT+1j
δ j
)
,(A-4)
for t=0, . . . , T−1. From equation (A-4) we can solve for q¯t for all t and it is straightforward
to verify that
q¯t = Dt
∑
j
(
βt+1j −βT+1j
1−βT+1j
δ j
)
∑
j
(
βtj−βt+1j
1−βT+1j
δ j
) , t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
solves equation (A-4) for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Given q¯t, it follows that
¯λtk = Et
[
Dkt+1 + ¯λt+1,kq¯t+1
Dt+1 + q¯t+1
]
=
∑
j
(
βt+1j −βt+2j
1−βT+1j
δ j
)
∑
j
(
βt+1j −βT+1j
1−βT+1j
δ j
)Et[dkt+1] +
∑
j
(
βt+2j −βT+1j
1−βT+1j
δ j
)
∑
j
(
βt+1j −βT+1j
1−βT+1j
δ j
)Et[¯λt+1,k],
for all k = 1, . . . ,K, and all t = 0, . . . , T − 1. Solving for ¯λtk recursively, we obtain
¯λtk =
1∑
j
(
βt+1j −βT+1j
1−βT+1j
δ j
) T∑
τ=t+1
(∑
j
βτj − βτ+1j
1− βT+1j
δ j
)
Et[dkτ ], and
qkt = ¯λtkq¯t = Dt
1∑
j
(
βtj−βt+1j
1−βT+1j
δ j
) T∑
τ=t+1
(∑
j
βτj − βτ+1j
1− βT+1j
δ j
)
Et[dkτ ],
for all k = 1, . . . ,K, and all t = 0, . . . , T − 1. This proves the theorem.
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Proof of Theorem 3. If (λ, q) is an equilibrium with T-period fund separation then, for
all l and all t, there exists ¯λtl such that λitl = (1 − λit0)¯λtl for all i. As before, this implies
that
qlt =
∑
j
λjtlw
j
t = ¯λtl
∑
j
(1− λjt0)wjt,
for all l and all t. For all τ > t, we have
w
i
τ = w
i
t
τ−1∏
s=t
[
(Ds+1 + q¯s+1)(1− λis0)∑
j(1− λjs0)wjs
]
.
Substituting this into the first-order condition (3) for the case where βi = β for all i and
η ≠ 1, we obtain
¯λtk
[∑
j
(1− λjt0)wjt
]1−η
=
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tEt
[(
λit0
1− λit0
)η
(λiτ0)
1−η(A-5)
Dkt+1 + qkt+1
(Dt+1 + qt+1)η
τ−1∏
s=t+1
[
(Ds+1 + q¯s+1)(1− λis0)∑
j(1− λjs0)wjs
]1−η⎤⎦ .
Since
∑
k
¯λtk = 1, this implies[∑
j
(1− λjt0)wjt
]1−η
=
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tEt
[(
λit0
1− λit0
)η
(λiτ0)
1−η(A-6)
(Dt+1 + qt+1)
1−η
τ−1∏
s=t+1
[
(Ds+1 + q¯s+1)(1− λis0)∑
j(1− λjs0)wjs
]1−η⎤⎦ .
Let t= T − 1. Then, for all i and given (λjT−1,0)j≠i, there exists a unique solution λiT−1,0 to
equation (A-6). Since λiT0=1 for all i, it is evident that λiT−1,0=λT−1,0 for all i if (λiT−1,0)i
solves equation (A-6) simultaneously for all i. By induction, it then follows that λit0 = λt0
for all i and all 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1.
This implies that
qlt = (1− λt0)¯λtl
∑
j
w
j
t = (1− λt0)¯λtl
(
Dt + q¯t
)
, t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Substituting this into equation (A-5), we get
¯λtk =
(λt0)
η
1− λt0
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tEt
[
(λτ,0)
1−η
(
Dτ + q¯τ
Dt + q¯t
)1−η Dkt+1 + qkt+1
Dt+1 + q¯t+1
]
,(A-7)
for t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
We now solve for the equilibrium price q. We have already seen that
qkt = ¯λtk(1− λt0)
(
Dt + q¯t
)
,
for t = 0, . . . , T − 1. Summing over all k, we get
q¯t = (1− λt0)
(
Dt + q¯t
)
⇐⇒ q¯t = 1− λt0
λt0
Dt, t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
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Substituting this into equation (A-7) gives
¯λtk =
λt0
1− λt0
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tEt
[(
Dτ
Dt
)1−η Dkt+1 + qkt+1
Dt+1 + q¯t+1
]
, for t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Summing over all k and solving for λt0, we obtain that
λt0 =
(Dt)1−η
(Dt)1−η +
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−tEt
[
(Dτ )1−η
] , t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Hence,
¯λtk =
1∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−tEt
[
(Dτ )1−η
] T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tEt
[
(Dτ )1−η
Dkt+1 + qkt+1
Dt+1 + q¯t+1
]
=
1∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−tEt
[
(Dτ )1−η
] T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tEt
[
(Dτ )1−η
(
λt+1,0dkt+1
+ (1− λt+1,0)¯λt+1,k
)]
.
Solving backwards for ¯λtk gives
¯λtk =
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−tEt
[
Dkτ
(Dτ )η
]
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−tEt[(Dτ )1−η]
,
for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1, k = 1, . . . ,K. This implies that
qkt = ¯λtkq¯t
= ¯λtk(Dt)η
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tEt
[
(Dτ )1−η
]
= (Dt)η
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tEt
[
Dkτ
(Dτ )η
]
,
for t = 0, . . . , T − 1. The uniqueness of the equilibrium price vector follows from
Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 4. The proof is a simple adaptation of the corresponding proof for the
case T=1 (see, e.g., Magill and Quinzii (1996), Prop. 16.13). Let Ui(c)=∑Tt=0βti E [ui(ct)],
where
− u
i ′(x)
ui ′′(x)
= ai + bx,
for some constants ai ∈ R+ and b ∈ R and all i= 1, . . . , I. This implies
u
i(x) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(ai + bx)1−1/b
1/b(1− 1/b) , if b ≠ 0 and b ≠ 1
−aie−x/ai , if b= 0
ln(ai + x) , if b= 1
.
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Let (ci)i be a Pareto-efficient allocation. Then, there exists (μi)i with μi ≥ 0 for all i such
that (ci)i solves
max
∑
i
μiUi(ci)(A-8)
s.t.
∑
i
c
i
t = Dt, for all t = 0, . . . , T.
Observe that μi = 0 implies that ci = 0, in which case we define αit := γ it := 0 for all t.
Hence, if μi=0, we can delete investor i from the optimization problem (A-8) and consider
the remaining investors only. Therefore, in the following we will assume that μi > 0 for
all i. By strict concavity of Ui, the first-order condition for problem (A-8) is necessary and
sufficient. It is given by
μi
∂Ui(ci)
∂ci(ξt)
= μ1
∂U1(c1)
∂c1(ξt)
, for all i ≠ 1, for all ξt, and for all t = 0, . . . , T.
Case 1. Let b ≠ 0. Then the first-order condition reads
μiβtiπ(ξt)
(
ai + bci(ξt)
)−1/b
b = μ1βt1π(ξt)
(
a1 + bc1(ξt)
)−1/b
b,
which is equivalent to
ai + bci(ξt) =
(
μiβti
μ1βt1
)b (
a1 + bc1(ξt)
)
.
If we define Kit := ((μiβti)/(μ1βt1))b, and Kt :=
∑
i K
i
t , we obtain
a1 + bc1(ξt) =
∑
i ai + bD(ξt)
Kt
,
where we have used the fact that
∑
i c
i(ξt) = D(ξt). From this we compute
c
i(ξt) =
Kit
Kt
∑
j aj
b −
ai
b +
Kit
Kt
D(ξt).
Hence, if we define
αit :=
Kit
Kt
∑
j aj
b −
ai
b and γ
i
t :=
Kit
Kt
,
then αit and γ it are independent of ξt and
∑
i α
i
t = 0 and
∑
i γ
i
t = 1. We have shown that
c
i
t = α
i
t + γ
i
t Dt, for all t = 0, . . . , T.
By definition, if ai = 0 for all i (CRRA utility), then αit = 0 for all i and for all t, and hence
there is linear sharing in any Pareto-efficient allocation. If in addition βi = β for all i, then
Kit = (μi/μ1)b is independent of t, which implies that γ it is independent of t.
Case 2. Let b= 0. Then the first-order condition reads
μiβtiπ(ξt)e
−ci(ξt)/ai = μ1βt1π(ξt)e
−c1(ξt)/a1 ,
396 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
which is equivalent to
ci(ξt)
ai
=
c1(ξt)
a1
+ ln
(
μiβti
μ1βt1
)
.
Define Kit := ln((μiβti )/(μ1βt1)). Then
c
i(ξt) =
ai
a1
c
1(ξt) + aiKit .
From
∑
i c
i(ξt) = D(ξt), it follows that
c
1(ξt) =
a1∑
j aj
D(ξt)− a1∑
j aj
∑
j
ajKjt ,
which implies
c
i(ξt) = α
i
t + γ
i
t D(ξt),
where αit= aiKit − (ai/(
∑
j aj))
∑
j ajK
j
t and γ it = ai/(
∑
j aj). Observe that again α
i
t and γ it
are independent of ξt and that
∑
i α
i
t = 0 and
∑
i γ
i
t = 1.
Proof of Theorem 5. Let c∗i be investor i’s consumption in the equilibrium with T-period
fund separation, (λ∗, q∗), as characterized in Theorem 1, respectively Theorem 3. Then,
for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1 and all i,
w
i
t+1 =
wi0
∏t
τ=0(1− λ∗iτ0)∑
j
(
w
j
0
∏t
τ=0(1− λ∗jτ0)
) (Dt+1 + qt+1)
= wi0Zt+1
t∏
τ=0
(1− λ∗iτ0),
where Zt+1 is independent of i. This implies
c∗i0
c∗it+1
=
λ∗i00w
i
0
λ∗it+1,0w
i
t+1
=
λ∗i00
Zt+1λ∗it+1,0
∏t
τ=0(1− λ∗iτ0)
.
By Theorem 1, if η = 1, then λ∗it0 = (1− βi)/(1− βT+1−ti ) for all t. Hence,
λ∗i00
λ∗it+1,0
∏t
τ=0(1− λ∗iτ0)
=
1
βt+1i
,
which implies
βt+1i
c∗i0
c∗it+1
=
1
Zt+1
,
and
∂ξt+1 U
i(c∗i)
∂ξ0 Ui(c∗i)
= βt+1i π(ξt+1)
c∗i0
c∗i(ξt+1)
=
π(ξt+1)
Z(ξt+1)
,
which is independent of i.
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Let η ≠ 1 and βi = β for all i. Then, by Theorem 3, λ∗it0 = λ∗t0 is independent of i for
all t. This implies wit+1 = (wi0/(
∑
j w
j
0))(Dt+1 + q¯t+1). Hence,
c∗i0
c∗it+1
=
λ∗00(D0 + q¯0)
λ∗t+1,0(Dt+1 + q¯t+1)
is independent of i. Therefore,
∂ξt+1 U
i(c∗i)
∂ξ0 Ui(c∗i)
= βt+1π(ξt+1)
(
c∗i0
c∗i(ξt+1)
)η
= βt+1π(ξt+1)
(
λ∗00(D0 + q¯0)
λ∗t+1,0(Dt+1 + q¯t+1)
)η
,
which is independent of i. Thus, in both cases the agent’s utility gradients are collinear in
equilibrium, ∇Ui(c∗i) ‖ ∇Uj(c∗j) for all i ≠ j, which implies the Pareto efficiency of the
equilibrium allocation (c∗i)i.
Proof of Theorem 6. Let (λ∗, q∗) be an equilibrium with T-period fund separation for the
economy. Then, by Theorem 5, the corresponding consumption allocation (c∗i) is Pareto
efficient. Hence, the agents’ utility gradients∇Ui(c∗i) are collinear,∇Ui(c∗i) ‖ ∇Uj(c∗j)
for all i ≠ j. For all i= 1, . . . , I, define
γi :=
1
∂ξ0 Ui(c∗i)
=
(
c
∗i
0
)η
.
If η = 1, define ˆU : Rd++ → R by
ˆU(c) := sup
{∑
i
γiUi(ci)
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i
c
i = c, ci ∈ Rd++ for all i
}
, c ∈ Rd++ .
If η ≠ 1, define ˆU : Rd+ → R accordingly. Then ˆU(c¯) =
∑
i γiU
i(c¯ i) if and only if
γi∇Ui(c¯ i) = γj∇Uj(c¯ j), for all i ≠ j.
Moreover,
∇ ˆU(c¯ ) = γi∇Ui(c¯ i), for all i.(A-9)
Let e¯ ∈ Rd++ be given by e¯t=Dt for all t. Then, e¯=
∑
i c
∗i and by definition of ˆU it follows
that
ˆU(e¯ ) =
∑
i
γiUi(c∗i).
Hence, by equation (A-9), q∗ is an equilibrium price vector in the representative agent
economy, where the agent has utility function ˆU and endowment e¯.
Since all Ui are in expected utility form, ˆU has expected utility form as well. Consider
first the case where all investors in the heterogeneous agent economy have unit constant
relative risk aversion. Then, it is straightforward to show that ˆU is given by
ˆU(c) = E
[
T∑
t=0
(At + Bt ln(ct))
]
, for all c ∈ Rd++,
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where
At =
∑
i
γiβ
t
i ln(αit) and Bt =
∑
i
γiβ
t
i ,
and αit = γiβti/
∑
j γjβ
t
j for all i and t = 0, . . . , T . Hence, a monotone transformation of
ˆU has expected logarithmic utility form and therefore, the representative agent has unit
CRRA.
Similarly, if all investors in the heterogeneous agent economy have CRRA η ≠ 1 and
the same discount factor β, then ˆU is given by
ˆU(c) = E
[
T∑
t=0
Gt
1
1− η (ct)
1−η
]
, for all c ∈ Rd+,
where Gt = βt(
∑
i(γi)
1
η )η for all t= 0, . . . , T . Hence, the representative agent has CRRA
equal to η.
Finally, observe that γi only depends on (βj)j, (δ j)j, and D0 for all i:
c
∗i
0 = λ
∗i
00w
i
0 = λ
∗i
00δ
i(D0 + q¯0) =
λ∗i00δ
i∑
j λ
∗j
00δ
j D0.
If η ≠ 1, then
γi =
(
c
∗i
0
)η
=
(
δiD0
)η
.
If η = 1, then
γi = c
∗i
0 =
1− βi
1− βT+1i
δi
(∑
j
1− βj
1− βT+1j
δ j
)−1
D0.
Hence, ˆU is independent of the future dividend process (Dt)t=1,...,T .
References
Algoet, P. H., and T. M. Cover. “Asymptotic Optimality and Asymptotic Equipartition Properties of
Log-Optimum Investment.” Annals of Probability, 16 (1988), 876–898.
Antonelli, G. B. “Sulla Teoria Matematica della Economia Politica.” Pisa, Italy: Nella Tipografia del
Folchetto (1886). English translation by J. S. Chipman and A. P. Kirman in Preferences, Utility,
and Demand, J. S. Chipman, L. Hurwicz, M. K. Richter, and H. F. Sonnenschein, eds. New York,
NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. (1971).
Barberis, N., and M. Huang. “Mental Accounting, Loss Aversion, and Individual Stock Returns.”
Journal of Finance, 56 (2001), 1247–1292.
Black, F., and M. Scholes. “The Effects of Dividend Yield and Dividend Policy on Common Stock
Prices and Returns.” Journal of Financial Economics, 1 (1974), 1–22.
Breiman, L. “Optimal Gambling Systems for Favorable Games.” Fourth Berkeley Symposium on
Mathematical Statistics and Probability, 1 (1961), 65–78.
Browne, S. “The Return on Investment from Proportional Portfolio Strategies.” Advances in Applied
Probability, 30 (1998), 216–238.
Campbell, J. Y., and J. H. Cochrane. “By Force of Habit: A Consumption-Based Explanation of
Aggregate Stock Market Behavior.” Journal of Political Economy, 107 (1999), 205–251.
Campbell, J. Y., and R. J. Shiller. “The Dividend-Price Ratio and Expectations of Future Dividends
and Discount Factors.” Review of Financial Studies, 1 (1988), 195–228.
Cass, D., and J. E. Stiglitz. “The Structure of Investor Preference and Asset Returns and Separability
in Portfolio Allocation: A Contribution to the Pure Theory of Mutual Funds.” Journal of Economic
Theory, 2 (1970), 122–160.
Gerber, Hens, and Woehrmann 399
Cochrane, J. H. “A Cross-Sectional Test of an Investment-Based Asset Pricing Model.” Journal of
Political Economy, 104 (1996), 572–621.
Constantinides, G. M. “Intertemporal Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous Consumers and without
Demand Aggregation.” Journal of Business, 55 (1982), 253–267.
Dempster, M. A. H. Risk Management: Value at Risk and Beyond. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press (2002).
Dempster, M. A. H.; M. Germano; E. A. Medova; and M. Villaverde. “Global Asset Liability Man-
agement.” British Actuarial Journal, 9 (2003), 137–195.
Den Haan, W. J., and A. Marcet. “Solving the Stochastic Growth Model by Parameterizing Expecta-
tions.” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 8 (1990), 31–34.
Detemple, J., and P. Gottardi. “Aggregation, Efficiency and Mutual Fund Separation in Incomplete
Markets.” Economic Theory, 11 (1998), 443–455.
Dickey, D. A., and W. A. Fuller. “Distribution of the Estimators for Autoregressive Time Series with
a Unit Root.” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 74 (1979), 427–431.
Dimson, E., and P. Marsh. “The Demise of Size.” In Security Market Imperfections in World Wide
Equity Markets, chap. 6, D. B. Keim and W. T. Ziemba, eds. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press (2000).
Evstigneev, I. V.; T. Hens; and K. R. Schenk-Hoppe´. “Evolutionary Stable Stock Markets.” Economic
Theory, 27 (2006), 449–468.
Evstigneev, I. V.; T. Hens; and K. R. Schenk-Hoppe´. “Globally Evolutionarily Stable Portfolio Rules.”
Journal of Economic Theory, 140 (2008), 197–228.
Fama, E. F., and K. R. French. “Dividend Yields and Expected Stock Returns.” Journal of Financial
Economics, 22 (1988), 3–25.
Goetzmann, W. N., and P. Jorion. “A Longer Look at Dividend Yields.” Journal of Business, 68 (1995),
483–508.
Gollier, C. The Economics of Risk and Time. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2001).
Grandmont, J. M. “Transformations of the Commodity Space, Behavioral Heterogeneity, and the Ag-
gregation Problem.” Journal of Economic Theory, 57 (1992), 1–35.
Hagiwara, M., and M. A. Herce. “Risk Aversion and Stock Price Sensitivity to Dividends.” American
Economic Review, 87 (1997), 738–745.
Hakansson, N. H. “Optimal Investment and Consumption Strategies under Risk for a Class of Utility
Functions.” Econometrica, 38 (1970), 587–607.
Hakansson, N. H., and W. T. Ziemba. “Capital Growth Theory.” In Handbooks in Operations Research
and Management Science, Vol. 9 (Finance), chap. 3, R. A. Jarrow, V. Maksimovic, and W. T.
Ziemba, eds. Amsterdam: Elsevier BV (1995).
Hens, T.; S. Reimann; and B. Vogt. “Nash Competitive Equilibria and Two-Period Fund Separation.”
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 40 (2004), 321–346.
Huang, C.-F., and R. H. Litzenberger. Foundations for Financial Economics. New York, NY: North-
Holland (1988).
Ingersoll, J. E., Jr. Theory of Financial Decision Making. Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Pub-
lishers (1987).
Jagannathan, R., and Z. Wang. “The Conditional CAPM and the Cross-Section of Expected Returns.”
Journal of Finance, 51 (1996), 3–53.
Jarque, C. M., and A. K. Bera. “A Test for Normality of Observations and Regression Residuals.”
International Statistical Review, 55 (1987), 163–172.
Judd, K. L.; F. Kubler; and K. Schmedders. “Bond Portfolios and Two-Fund Separation in the Lucas
Asset-Pricing Model.” Discussion Paper 1427, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical
Studies in Economics and Management Science (2006).
Keim, D. B. “Dividend Yields and Stock Returns: Implications of Abnormal January Returns.”
Journal of Financial Economics, 14 (1985), 473–489.
Kelly, J. L. “A New Interpretation of Information Rate.” Bell System Technical Journal, 35 (1956),
917–926.
Kocherlakota, N. R. “The Equity Premium: It’s Still a Puzzle.” Journal of Economic Literature, 34
(1996), 42–71.
Kraus, A., and R. H. Litzenberger. “Market Equilibrium in a Multiperiod State Preference Model with
Logarithmic Utility.” Journal of Finance, 30 (1975), 1213–1227.
Kydland, F. E., and E. C. Prescott. “Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations.” Econometrica, 50
(1982), 1345–1370.
Lettau, M.; W. Semmler; and P. Woehrmann. “Nonparametric Estimation of Time-Varying Character-
istics of Intertemporal Asset Pricing Models.” Working Paper, New School University (2007).
Litzenberger, R. H., and K. Ramaswamy. “The Effect of Personal Taxes and Dividends on Capital
Asset Prices: Theory and Empirical Evidence.” Journal of Financial Economics, 7 (1979),
163–195.
400 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Litzenberger, R. H., and K. Ramaswamy. “Dividends, Short Selling Restrictions, Tax-Induced Investor
Clienteles and Market Equilibrium.” Journal of Finance, 35 (1980), 469–482.
Lucas, R. E. “Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy.” Econometrica, 46 (1978), 1429–1445.
Magill, M., and M. Quinzii. Theory of Incomplete Markets. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1996).
Mehra, R., and E. C. Prescott. “The Equity Premium: A Puzzle.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 15
(1985), 145–161.
Merton, R. C. “Optimum Consumption and Portfolio Rules in a Continuous-Time Model.” Journal of
Economic Theory, 3 (1971), 373–413.
Perold, A. F., and W. F. Sharpe. “Dynamic Strategies for Asset Allocation.” Financial Analysts Jour-
nal, 44 (1988), 16–27.
Quah, J. K.-H. “The Law of Demand When Income Is Price Dependent.” Econometrica, 65 (1997),
1421–1442.
Roll, R. “Evidence on the ‘Growth-Optimum’ Model.” Journal of Finance, 28 (1973), 551–566.
Rubinstein, M. “The Strong Case for the Generalized Logarithmic Utility Model as the Premier Model
of Financial Markets.” Journal of Finance, 31 (1976), 551–571.
Russell, T. “Portfolio Separation: The Analytic Case.” Economics Letters, 6 (1980), 59–66.
Samuelson, P. A. “Lifetime Portfolio Selection by Dynamic Stochastic Programming.” Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, 51 (1969), 239–246.
Spare, A., and P. Ciotti. Relative Dividend Yield: Common Stock Investing for Income and Apprecia-
tion. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons (1999).
Thorp, E. O. “Portfolio Choice and the Kelly Criterion.” In Stochastic Models in Finance,
W. T. Ziemba and R. G. Vickson, eds. New York, NY: Academic Press (1971).
Tobin, J. “Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk.” Review of Economic Studies, 25 (1958),
65–86.
von Neumann, J., and O. Morgenstern. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press (1944).
Welch, I., and A. Goyal. “A Comprehensive Look at the Empirical Performance of Equity Premium
Prediction.” Review of Financial Studies, 21 (2008), 1455–1508.
Wolf, M. “Stock Returns and Dividend Yields Revisited: A New Way to Look at an Old Problem.”
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 18 (2000), 18–30.
Ziemba, W. T., and J. M. Mulvey. Worldwide Asset and Liability Modeling. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press (1998).
